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TIPPING THE SCALES?: MAINE ADOPTS THE 
CONTINUING NEGLIGENT TREATMENT DOCTRINE 
IN BAKER V. FARRAND 
Michael P. Beers* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Baker v. Farrand,1 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law 
Court, held that for a series of related negligent acts or omissions committed by a 
health care provider or practitioner, a single cause of action “accrues” under the 
Maine Health Security Act2 (hereinafter MHSA) on the date of the last act or 
omission that contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.3  Hence, in situations where a 
physician provides continuing negligent treatment to a patient in which each and 
every one of the physician’s actions are negligent, the MHSA’s three-year statute 
of limitations does not begin to run until the last date of negligent care.4  Courts 
refer to this construction of the law as the “continuing negligent treatment 
doctrine.”5 
In Baker, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, his primary care physician, 
provided negligent care for a span of four years by failing to refer him to a 
urologist when diagnostic tests taken during this period indicated the possibility of 
prostate disease.6  After being diagnosed with adenocarcinoma of the prostate, the 
plaintiff filed suit, claiming that as a result of his delayed referral, his treatment 
options became limited.7  The Superior Court found that the MHSA’s statute of 
limitations prevented the plaintiff from bringing a claim for any acts that had 
occurred more than three years before he filed his suit.8 
The Law Court reversed the Superior Court’s ruling by holding that for 
multiple acts or omissions that each individually contribute to an injury, the 
relevant date for statute of limitations purposes is the last date of negligent 
treatment.9  In doing so, the Law Court adopted the continuing negligent treatment 
doctrine and, consequently, allowed the plaintiff’s case to go forward.10  To recover 
for any acts or omissions that occurred outside the three-year limitations period, the 
plaintiff would have to establish that each act or omission “deviated from the 
applicable standard of care and, in combination with an act or omission that 
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2013.  I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Wriggins and the Maine Law 
Review staff for their review of this Note.  I would also like to thank my family and friends for their 
continued support, as well as Attorney William H. Childs for his guidance. 
 1. 2011 ME 91, 26 A.3d 806. 
 2. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2902 (2010). 
 3. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 25, 26 A.3d 806. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 25, 960 A.2d 1178 (Silver, J., dissenting). 
 6. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶¶ 3-4, 26 A.3d 806. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. ¶ 5. 
 9. Id. ¶ 24. 
 10. Id. ¶ 34. 
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occurred within the limitations period, contributed to and was a proximate cause of 
his harm.”11 
This Note begins, in Part II, by providing a background of statutes of 
limitations and the ability of courts to toll them in certain circumstances.  Part III 
examines the different ways courts define “accrual” under medical malpractice 
statutes of limitations and reviews the Law Court’s past attempt of reconciling 
them with the MHSA.  Part IV analyzes the Law Court’s rationale in finding the 
continuing negligent treatment doctrine consistent with the MHSA.  Part V 
demonstrates that the Law Court correctly adopted the continuing negligent 
treatment doctrine, as opposed to other accrual methods, but unnecessarily limited 
the doctrine’s applicability.  This Note concludes by maintaining that the MHSA 
allowed the Law Court to join the increasing number of states that have moved 
away from strict interpretations of statutes of limitations; however, the Law Court’s 
insistence that each act or omission must be negligent, as opposed to requiring 
negligent treatment overall, will prevent plaintiffs in similar circumstances from 
recovering for their injuries. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Statutes of Limitations 
Statutes of limitations establish time limits for a party to bring an action, either 
in a criminal prosecution or a civil lawsuit.12  Their primary purpose is to “‘protect 
defendant[s] against loss of witnesses and evidence and to protect his acts in 
reasonable reliance upon plaintiff’s inaction.’”13  Most statutes of limitations 
“possess the same essential structure: they classify claims into groups, they assign 
each group of claims a limitation period of fixed duration, and they extinguish 
claims not filed before the limitation period expires.”14  In dealing with statutes of 
limitations, the timing of when the statutory period begins to run determines 
whether the claim is barred.15 
In order to prescribe the period by which the statutory period begins to run, all 
statutes of limitations “use some sort of terminology to describe when the period of 
limitations commences, or as it is sometimes stated, . . . when the cause of action 
accrues.”16  Some statutes use specific terms such as “‘from the date of the act or 
omission complained of,’ ‘from the time the injury was done,’ and ‘when the 
damage resulting therefrom is sustained and is capable of ascertainment.’”17  
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. 
 12. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009). 
 13. Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121, 172 (2001) (citing 
WILLIAM D. FERGUSON, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVING STATUTES 43 (1978)). 
 14. Andrew J. Wistrich, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Statutes of Limitation, 50 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 607, 611 (2008). 
 15. See id. at 609-10. 
 16. 4 AM. JUR. TRIALS 456 (1966). 
 17. Id.  As detailed in Part III, most courts have adopted various doctrines to determine the date the 
statute of limitations begins to run.  The following state legislatures have created hybrid rules that 
combine elements from these doctrines to better define accrual: California, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia.  
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Without such specificity, courts themselves must determine when a cause of action 
accrues, which has led to unpredictable results.18 
Statutes of limitations are to be distinguished from statutes of repose in that the 
latter “extinguishes a cause of action after a fixed period of time . . . regardless of 
when the cause of action accrued.”19  In other words, statutes of repose establish 
“the maximum length of time available . . . that begins to run at a point . . . that 
may occur a substantial time after the alleged negligence.”20  When the two are 
used simultaneously, a statute of limitations sets the date for when a cause of action 
accrues, while the statute of repose establishes an outer limit that prevents suits 
from being filed after a period of time from the date of the negligence.21 
                                                                                                                 
See CAL. CIV. CODE § 340.5 (West 2011) (statute begins to run either after the date of injury or when the 
plaintiff discovers the injury, whichever occurs first); IOWA CODE § 614.1.9.a (2011) (statute begins to 
run on the date the plaintiff knew or through reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice 
in writing of the injury, whichever comes first); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(c) (2011) (cause of action 
accrues at the time of the occurrence that caused the injury, unless the injury is not reasonably 
ascertainable, in which case the period of limitations should not commence until the injury becomes 
reasonably ascertainable); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-205 (2011) (statute of limitations begins to run on 
the date of injury or when the plaintiff discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever occurs last, but statute of repose sets absolute limit); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 41A.097 (2011) (statute begins to run on the earlier of the date of injury or when the plaintiff 
discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
508:4 (2011) (statute begins to run upon injury, unless the injury was not reasonably discoverable, in 
which case the period begins when the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the 
injury); N.Y. C.P.L.R § 214-a (MCKINNEY 2011) (in the continuous treatment context the statute begins 
to run on the date of the last treatment that gave rise to the injury); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.1 (2011) 
(statute begins to run on the day of the injury, unless the injury could not have been discoverable with 
reasonable diligence, in which case the statute begins to run when the malpractice should have been 
discovered with reasonable diligence); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.251 (West 2011) 
(statute of limitations begins to run when the treatment that is the subject of the claim is complete); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 521 (2011) (statute of limitations begins to run on the later of the date of the 
incident, or when the injury was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 4.16.350 (2011) (statute of limitations begins to run on the later of the date of the act or 
omission or when the injury was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered); W. VA. CODE 
§ 55-7B-4 (2011) (statute of limitations begins to run on the later of the date of the act or omission or 
when the injury was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered). 
  While these statutes do in fact provide more guidance, some ambiguity may still remain in 
trying to pinpoint the date of an injury in situations where treatment has occurred over the course of 
multiple years.  See DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, 2 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 13.05[1] 
(Gordon L. Ohlsson, ed., Matthew Bender 2011).  Even with clearer language, “malpractice claims 
pose[] unique difficulties which require[] . . . modify[ing] the general statute of limitations.” Caughell v. 
Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 876 P.2d 898, 901 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (as a result of 
ambiguity within the statute, the court adopted the continuing negligent treatment doctrine when 
appropriate). 
 18. See 4 AM. JUR. TRIALS 456 (1966). 
 19. 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1490 (2011).   
 20. Robin Miller, Annotation, Timeliness of Action Under Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose, 
Aside from Effect of Fraudulent Concealment of Patient’s Cause of Action, 14 A.L.R 6th 301 (2006). 
 21. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (2011) (“No action to recover damages for injury to the 
person . . . caused by negligence . . . shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury 
is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and 
except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission 
complained of . . . .”).  Here, the two-year statute of limitations begins to run on date of the injury, its 
2012] TIPPING THE SCALES? 579 
B.  Tolling the Statute of Limitations 
Once the statute of limitations has run, the claim is extinguished, unless the 
party bringing the suit can “toll” the statutory period by “show[ing] facts which 
remove its bar of the action.”22  Generally, tolling occurs when the plaintiff has 
been prevented from asserting his or her rights through various circumstances such 
as legal disability, lack of information, or the inability to identify the defendant 
after exercising reasonable diligence.23  In determining whether the statute of 
limitations should be tolled, courts look to the legislative intent behind the statute.24  
When consistent with the purpose of the statute, courts may toll the claim and 
remove it from the limitations period.25  Often the legislature explicitly provides 
scenarios in which the statute of limitations should be tolled.26 
III.  WHEN DOES AN INJURY “ACCRUE” UNDER MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTES? 
A.  Traditional View 
Under the traditional view, a cause of action for medical malpractice accrues at 
the time of the negligent act27 or when the wrongful act results in a legal injury to 
the plaintiff.28  Courts and legislatures recognize that a bright-line rule based on a 
strict accrual date favors the defendant and can produce harsh results for the 
plaintiff.29  However, courts that “apply the rule justify their decision on the basis 
of the same reasoning that underpins all limitations, namely, that the lapse of time 
works to the disadvantage of the defendants in that witnesses die or become 
otherwise unavailable, and the production of necessary records becomes 
increasingly difficult.”30 
                                                                                                                 
discovery, or when it should have reasonably been discovered; however, the statute of repose sets an 
absolute limit of three years after the negligence occurred, regardless of when it is discovered.  See id. 
 22. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 133 (2010).  Courts differ as to whether a statute of repose 
may be tolled.  Compare Rudenauer v. Zafiropoulos, 837 N.E.2d 278, 281 (Mass. 2005) (statute of 
repose not subject to any form of tolling), with Witt v. St. Vincent’s Med. Ctr., 746 A.2d 753, 756-57 
(Conn. 2000) (statute of repose may be tolled under certain circumstances). 
 23. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 133 (2010). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id.  Courts sometimes also employ “equitable tolling” and toll the statute of limitations 
under extraordinary circumstances without clear direction from legislatures, so long as such tolling is 
consistent with the legislative scheme.  See id. § 134.  However, this practice is not universally accepted, 
as some courts only toll the statute of limitations when the legislature has granted them the power to do 
so.  See id. § 133. 
 27. LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 13A.03[1]. 
 28. See, e.g., Ex parte Sonnier, 707 So. 2d 635, 638 (Ala. 1997); Kaminer v. Canas, 653 S.E.2d 691, 
695 (Ga. 2007); Stuard v. Jorgenson, 249 P.3d 1156, 1160 (Idaho 2011); Rudenauer v. Zafiropoulos, 
837 N.E.2d 278, 282 (Mass. 2005); Solowy v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 561 N.W.2d 843, 845-46 (Mich. 
1997). 
 29. LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 13A.03[1]. 
 30. Id.  It should be noted, however, that some courts in jurisdictions that apply this rule make an 
exception when a foreign object has been left inside the body of a surgical patient.  See id. § 13A.03[2]. 
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B.  Continuous Treatment Doctrine 
The continuous treatment doctrine (sometimes referred to as the termination of 
relationship doctrine)31 begins the running of the statute of limitations “upon the 
termination of the physician-patient relationship.”32  The rationale behind this rule 
is that as long as the relationship between the patient and physician exists, the latter 
has a continuing duty of care33 and the cause of action should not accrue until the 
termination of the relationship.34  Although more favorable to plaintiffs than the 
traditional view, courts that once employed the continuous treatment doctrine have 
since abandoned it as it sometimes may produce “the unconscionable result to 
[plaintiffs] who by exercising even the highest degree of care could not have 
discovered the cited wrong.”35  Alternatively, it has been rejected as inconsistent 
with legislative intent behind the statute of limitations’ protection of defendants.36 
C.  Continuous Course of Treatment Doctrine 
Under the continuous course of treatment doctrine, a cause of action accrues 
upon the termination of the physician-patient relationship for the particular 
condition that gave rise to the injury.37  Although sometimes also referred to as the 
continuous treatment doctrine,38 the continuous course of treatment doctrine differs 
from the continuous treatment doctrine as described above in that it requires that 
the treatment following the act of negligence be “related to the same original 
condition or complaint,”39 as opposed to the end of general treatment.40  The rule 
has been justified in that it promotes physician-patient relationships by letting the 
patient wait to challenge the quality of the defendant’s care until the treatment has 
ended.41  Rather than force a patient to interrupt necessary treatment in order to 
avoid the running of limitations, “the rule protects a patient who trusts the 
physicians so much that he or she would not otherwise think to question the quality 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 23, 960 A.2d 1178 (Silver, J., dissenting). 
 32. De Long v. Campbell, 104 N.E.2d 177, 177 (Ohio 1952). 
 33. See id. at 178. 
 34. See Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 35. Oliver v. Kaiser Cmty. Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438, 441 (Ohio 1983). 
 36. See Melanie Fitzgerald, The Continuous Treatment Rule: Ameliorating the Harsh Result of the 
Statute of Limitations in Medical Malpractice Cases, 52 S.C. L. REV. 955, 959-60 (discussing courts’ 
reasons for rejecting the continuous treatment doctrine). 
 37. See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 752 S.W.2d 25, 26-27 (Ark. 1988); Comstock v. Collier, 737 P.2d 845, 
849 (Colo. 1987); Sherwood v. Danbury Hosp., 746 A.2d 730, 736 (Conn. 2000); Harrison v. Valentini, 
184 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Ky. 2006); Carter v. Haygood, 892 So. 2d 1261, 1271 (La. 2001); Johnson v. 
Winthrop Labs. Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 190 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. 1971); Smith v. Dewey, 335 
N.W.2d 530, 533 (Neb. 1983); Borgia v. City of New York, 187 N.E.2d 777, 778 (N.Y. 1962); Horton 
v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 472 S.E.2d 778, 781 (N.C. 1996); Liffengren v. Bendt, 612 N.W.2d 629, 
633 (S.D. 2000); Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414, 417 (Wyo. 1985). 
 38. See Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶¶ 23-24, 960 A.2d 1178 (Silver, J., dissenting) 
(recognizing the difference between the two doctrines, but referring to both as the “continuous treatment 
doctrine”). 
 39. Borgia, 187 N.E.2d at 778. 
 40. See Horton, 472 S.E.2d at 781. 
 41. LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 13A.05[1]. 
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of the doctor’s care.”42  Courts that have not adopted the continuous course of 
treatment doctrine criticize it as contrary to the purposes of the statute of 
limitations absent clear direction from the legislature.43 
D.  Continuing Negligent Treatment Doctrine 
For courts that use the continuing negligent treatment doctrine, accrual begins 
upon the last act of negligent treatment related to a single condition.44  In effect, 
courts that have adopted this rule add a second requirement to the continuing 
course of treatment doctrine: the treatment following the original act of negligence 
must be negligent, rather than merely related to the negligent act.45  As opposed to 
the continuous course of treatment doctrine, the statute of limitations is only 
delayed until the last negligent act or omission, instead of the end of the treatment 
for the condition that gave rise to the injury.46  Courts that have added this 
requirement reason that in order for an injury to accrue on a date later than the 
initial negligent act, the entire treatment must constitute one continuing wrong.47  
Hence, in order to get the benefit of this doctrine, a plaintiff has the burden to show 
ongoing negligent treatment.48   
E.  The Discovery Rule 
Under the discovery rule, “the patient’s action accrues when he or she 
discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of the essential 
elements to the cause of action.”49  The rule is sometimes codified,50 but it has also 
been adopted in the absence of clear legislative intent.51  Even though the discovery 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Cunningham v. Huffman, 609 N.E.2d 321, 324 (Ill. 1993) (recognizing that courts have 
adopted the doctrine without direction from the legislature, but declining to do so). 
 44. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 13A.05[3]. 
 45. Ewing v. Beck, 520 A.2d 653, 663 n.11 (Del. 1987); Cunningham, 609 N.E.2d at 325; Farley v. 
Goode, 252 S.E.2d 594, 599 (Va. 1979); Caughell v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 876 P.2d 898, 
910 (Wash. 1994); Tamminen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 327 N.W.2d 55, 65 (Wis. 1982). 
 46. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 13A.05[3]. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. Id. § 13A.04(1).  While this is a general characterization, other courts require that the plaintiff 
also discover that the source of the injury was caused by the defendant’s conduct before the limitations 
period begins to run.  See Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 371 A.2d 170, 172 (N.H. 1977). 
 50. See Musculoskeletal Inst. Chartered v. Parham, 745 So. 2d 946, 951 (Fla. 1999); Yamaguchi v. 
Queen’s Med. Ctr., 648 P.2d 689, 691-92 (Haw. 1982); Rathje v. Mercy Hosp., 745 N.W.2d 443, 455, 
457 (Iowa 2008); Smith v. Sanders, 485 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Miss. 1986); Wing v. Lorton, 261 P.3d 
1122, 1126 (Okla. 2011); Gaston v. Parsons, 864 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Or. 1994); Strong v. Univ. of S.C. 
Sch. of Med., 447 S.E.2d 850, 851 (S.C. 1994); Daniels v. Gamma W. Brachytherapy, LLC, 221 P.3d 
256, 265 (Utah 2009). 
 51. See Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, 906 (Alaska 1991); Walk v. Ring, 44 P.3d 990, 994 
(Ariz. 2002) (en banc) (“Use of the word ‘accrues’ … permits judicial construction of the events of 
knowledge that will trigger accrual.”); Bussineau v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown Coll., 518 A.2d 
423, 425 (D.C. 1986); Booth v. Wiley, 839 N.E.2d 1168, 1172 (Ind. 2005) (“If the discovery date is 
more than two years following the . . . malpractice, the claimant has two years after discovery . . . to 
initiate a malpractice action.  But, if the discovery date is within two years . . . the statutory limitation 
period applies.”); Caravaggio v. D’Agostini, 765 A.2d 182, 187 (N.J. 2001); Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. 
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rule could potentially extend the statute of limitations long beyond the end of 
treatment, courts justify extending the period in order to “avoid the harsh and 
illogical consequences of interpreting the statute [of limitations] in a manner that 
outlaws the plaintiff’s claim before he was or should have been aware of its 
existence.”52 
F.  The Law Court’s Pre-Baker Ruling 
In Dickey v. Vermette,53 the Law Court declined to adopt either the continuous 
course of treatment or the continuing negligent treatment doctrines.54  In Dickey, a 
dental hygienist noticed a dark spot on the x-ray of the plaintiff’s teeth, noting that 
it was odd, but not concerning.55  In subsequent appointments, the same hygienist 
showed the spot to the defendant, a dentist, who remarked that that the office would 
“keep an eye on it.”56  Five years later, a second x-ray was taken and revealed that 
the spot had grown.57  The defendant then referred the plaintiff to an oral surgeon 
who diagnosed her with oral cancer.58  The Law Court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision to bar the plaintiff’s claim under the MHSA’s three-year statute of 
limitations, ruling that the statute’s language prevented the adoption of the 
continuous course of treatment doctrine.59  Because the plaintiff did not allege any 
negligence within the three-year limitations period, the Law Court declined to 
address whether the MHSA precluded the continuing negligent treatment 
doctrine.60   
Dissenting, Justice Silver argued that the facts of the case did not foreclose the 
adoption of the continuing negligent treatment doctrine because the proper inquiry 
should have been whether the treatment as a whole was negligent instead of 
determining if each individual act or omission was negligent.61  In support of this 
proposition, Justice Silver distinguished the proof required in an action for 
continuing negligent treatment and that involving a single negligent act.62  
Although both necessitate a showing of duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and 
damages, a plaintiff alleging a continuing course of negligent treatment need not 
prove which negligent act caused the injury as long as the “plaintiff proves that the 
continuing negligent treatment was the proximate cause of the injury.”63  
                                                                                                                 
Health Servs., 837 P.2d 442, 451 (N.M. 1992); Schanilec v. Grand Forks Clinic, Ltd., 599 N.W.2d 253, 
255-56 (N.D. 1999); Oliver v. Kaiser Cmty. Health Found., 449 N.E.2d 438, 443-44 (Ohio 1983); Fine 
v. Checcio, 870 A.2d 850, 859 (Pa. 2005); Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974).  For 
states that incorporate the discovery rule with additional elements, see supra note 17. 
 52. Raymond, 371 A.2d at 174. 
 53. 2008 ME 179, 960 A.2d 1178. 
 54. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. 
 55. Id. ¶ 2. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. 
 60. Id. ¶ 9. 
 61. Id. ¶ 33 (Silver, J., dissenting). 
 62. Id. ¶ 31. 
 63. Id. ¶ 33 (quoting Caughell v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 876 P.2d 898, 907 (Wash. 
1994)). 
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Accordingly, the fact that the plaintiff did not allege that each and every one of the 
defendant’s acts or omissions was negligent should not have been fatal to her 
claim.64 
IV.  THE BAKER DECISION 
A.  Factual Background and Procedural History 
From 1987 through 2006, Dr. Merrill Farrand served as Philip Baker’s primary 
care physician.65  As a part of this care, Farrand annually tested Baker’s prostate-
specific antigen (PSA) levels from 1996 through 2006.66  Any result above the 
normal test range of zero to four may suggest prostate disease.67  Baker’s tests 
revealed higher than normal PSA levels in every annual test from 2002 to 2006.68  
Only after receiving the October 2006 results, which indicated a PSA level of 7.7, 
did Farrand refer Baker to a urologist who, after performing a prostate biopsy, 
diagnosed Baker with adenocarcinoma of the prostate.69 
On September 14, 2007, Baker filed a notice of claim in accordance with the 
MHSA,70 alleging that Farrand breached the applicable standard of care by failing 
to refer him to a urologist in 2003, 2004, and 2005.71  He claimed that as a result of 
not being referred to a urologist earlier, his diagnosis was delayed until after the 
cancer spread, which limited his treatment options.72  Farrand raised an affirmative 
defense that the action was barred by the statute of limitations before a prelitigation 
screening panel appointed by the court,73 which ordered the parties to resolve the 
issue by motion with the Superior Court.74 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. ¶ 36. 
 65. Baker v. Farrand, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 3, 26 A.3d 806. 
 66. Id.  PSA tests are used to identify potential prostate diseases, such as prostate cancer, prostate 
hypertrophy, and prostatitis.  Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2853 (2010).  Specifically, Baker filed a written notice with the 
Superior Court pursuant to section 2853(1)(b).  Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 3, 26 A.3d 806. 
 71. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 4, 26 A.3d 806.  Although the complaint may have alleged the negligence 
began in 2003, the parties stipulated that the alleged negligent treatment began as early as 2002.  Id. ¶ 4 
n.1 (citation to footnote only). 
 72. Id. ¶ 4. 
 73. In accordance with the MHSA, the Chief Justice of the Superior Court recommends to each 
Superior Court clerk “the names of retired or active retired justices and judges, persons with judicial 
experience and other qualified persons to serve on screening panels . . . .”  ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, 
§ 2852(1) (2010).  The clerk must also maintain lists of health care practitioners, health care providers 
and attorneys who would be able to serve on these panels.  Id.  When a claim is filed under the MHSA, 
the Chief Justice then chooses a person from the list to serve as chair of the panel to screen the claim.  
Id. § 2852(2)(A).  The clerk then notifies this person of the Chief Justice’s decision and provides him or 
her with the list of health care practitioners, health care providers, and attorneys.  Id. § 2852(2)(B).  The 
chair must then choose an attorney, as well as one health care practitioner, and potentially a second 
health care practitioner if there is more than one defendant accused of professional negligence, to serve 
on the panel.  Id.  The rationale for these panels is “[t]o identify claims of professional negligence which 
merit compensation . . . to encourage early resolution . . . and to encourage early withdrawal or dismissal 
of nonmeritorious claims.”  Id. § 2851(1) (2010).  
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In August 2009, Farrand moved for partial summary judgment on any alleged 
negligent acts or omissions that occurred before September 14, 2004, based on the 
MHSA’s three-year statute of limitations,75 which provides that “[a]ctions for 
professional negligence shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of 
action accrues . . . [f]or purposes of this section, a cause of action accrues on the 
date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury.”76  In granting Farrand’s 
motion, the Superior Court determined that the statute of limitations effectively 
barred any acts occurring more than three years before his filing notice of 
September 14, 2007.77  The Superior Court found that Section 2902’s use of “act” 
and “omission” in the singular (as opposed to “acts” or “omissions”) indicated that 
each individual act must be considered on its own, separate from any other act or 
omission.78  In doing so, the court declined to recognize the continuing negligent 
treatment doctrine, where the statute of limitations “would begin to run for ‘a series 
of interrelated negligent acts that occurred during the course of treatment’ on the 
date of the last act of negligence, ‘as long as that act occurred within three years 
before the legal action was initiated.’”79 
In accordance with Rule 24 of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
parties filed an agreed-upon motion to report the case to the Law Court in order to 
review the partial summary judgment order and to determine the applicability of 
the continuing negligent treatment doctrine to the MHSA.80  As an exception to the 
final judgment rule, Rule 24 allows parties to obtain review from the Law Court if 
“acceptance would be consistent with [the Law Court’s] basic function as an 
appellate court [and not] improperly place [the Law Court] in the role of an 
advisory board.”81  The Law Court determined that the issue of “whether a cause of 
action for professional negligence under the [MSHA] exists for acts or omissions 
committed during a continuing course of negligent treatment when some of the acts 
                                                                                                                 
  Maine, as well as many other states, require this screening procedure in medical malpractice 
suits.  See Flanders v. Cooper, 1998 ME 28, ¶ 12, 706 A.2d 589; LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, 
§ 13A.02[2].  Other states have enacted voluntary review panels or require an affidavit from qualified 
experts to be filed with the complaint.  See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 13A.02[1], [3].  For 
more on the history of medical malpractice review panels, see id. § 13A.01. 
 74. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 4, 26 A.3d 806.  Screening panels have no jurisdiction over affirmative 
defenses and are required to refer them to the Chief Justice of the Superior Court.  ME. REV. STAT. tit. 
24, § 2853(5); ME. R. CIV. P. 80M(e). 
 75. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 5, 26 A.3d 806. 
 76. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2902 (2010). 
 77. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 5, 26 A.3d 806. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. (quoting Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶¶ 9, 25, 960 A.2d 1178 (Silver, J., dissenting)). 
 80. Id. ¶ 6.  Rule 24(a) provides that the Superior Court 
may, where all parties appearing so agree, report any action to the Law Court if it is of 
the opinion that any question of law presented is of sufficient importance or doubt to 
justify the report, provided that the decision therefore would in at least one alternative 
finally dispose of the action. 
ME. R. APP. P. 24(a). 
 81. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, ¶ 6, 957 A.2d 94 (quoting 
Morris v. Sloan, 1997 ME 179, ¶ 7, 698 A.2d 1038) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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or omissions occurred outside the limitations period” warranted Rule 24 treatment 
and accepted the case.82 
B.  Decision of the Law Court 
To determine when a cause of action for professional negligence “accrues,” the 
Law Court sought to first identify the MHSA’s meaning of “act or omission,” 
which the Act did not explicitly define.83  To decipher the term’s meaning, the Law 
Court looked to the MHSA’s definition “professional negligence.”84  Accounting 
for the four elements of every negligence claim,85 the statute recognized a cause of 
action for medical malpractice when the “acts or omissions complained of 
constitute a deviation from the applicable standard of care . . . and . . . [t]here is a 
reasonable medical or professional probability that the acts or omissions . . . 
proximately caused the injury complained of.”86 
In construing the language of the MHSA this way, the Law Court determined 
that “a single cause of action may arise from multiple acts or omissions even if 
each independent act or omission, viewed in isolation from the other acts or 
omissions, constitutes an independent deviation from the applicable standard of 
care.”87  Hence, in cases where there is a series of related acts or omissions, the key 
question becomes whether each act or omission on its own proximately caused the 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 7, 26 A.3d 806.  The decision whether to accept a case under Rule 24 
involves the related factors of whether 
(1) the question reported is of sufficient importance and doubt to outweigh the policy 
against piecemeal litigation; (2) the question might not have to be decided at all because 
of other possible dispositions; and (3) a decision on the issue would, in at least one 
alternative, dispose of the action. 
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
  Finding the first factor, the existence of sufficient importance, met, the Law Court determined 
that this type of scenario was capable of frequent repetition and would affect patients’ ability to sue and 
health care practitioners’ liability exposure.  Id. ¶ 9.  As for the second factor, other possible 
dispositions, it ruled that the question raised addressed a threshold matter relating to the application of 
the statute of limitations, making other possible dispositions limited.  Id. ¶ 10.  If, however, a claim for 
negligence did not arise within the limitations period, the Law Court ruled that the statute of limitations 
would bar the action, making it unnecessary to address the reported question.  Id.  Because the parties 
stipulated that Baker suffered indeterminate or negligible harm during the limitations period, the only 
possible disposition of the action was to determine whether the continuing negligent course of treatment 
doctrine should be applied in this case.  Id. ¶¶ 11-12.  As for the third factor, whether a decision would 
dispose of the action, because the parties further stipulated that Baker would dismiss the action with 
prejudice unless the Law Court vacated the partial summary judgment, a decision affirming the Superior 
Court’s judgment would dispose of the action.  Id. ¶ 13. 
 83. Id. ¶ 22. 
 84. Id.  The MHSA states that “professional negligence” occurs when: 
A.  There is a reasonable medical or professional probability that the acts or omissions 
complained of constitute a deviation from the applicable standard of care by the health 
care practitioner or health care provider charged with that care; and 
B.  There is a reasonable medical or professional probability that the acts or omissions 
complained of proximately caused the injury complained of. 
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2502(7) (2010). 
 85. The four elements are duty, breach, proximate causation, and harm.  See Baker, 2011 ME 91, 
¶ 23, 26 A.3d 806. 
 86. Id. (quoting ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2502(7) (2010)). 
 87. Id. ¶ 24. 
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alleged injury.88  If so, a single cause of action accrues from the date of the last act 
or omission that contributed to the injury because only at that point is the 
negligence complete.89  Conversely, if only one act or omission in a series of acts 
or omissions was the cause of the injury, the “cause of action would accrue from 
the date of that act or omission, and not from the dates of any subsequent acts or 
omissions.”90  Therefore, “in cases involving a continuing course of negligent 
treatment, the [MHSA] allows for the possibility that two or more negligent acts or 
omissions might combine to proximately cause a patient’s injury.”91  Under these 
circumstances, a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues for multiple negligent acts 
related to the same condition “on the date of the last act or omission by the health 
care provider or practitioner that contributed to the proximate causation of the 
patient’s harm.”92 
By reading the MHSA in this way, the Law Court recognized the continuing 
negligent treatment doctrine.93  Turning to the facts of Baker, Farrand sought 
partial summary judgment for only acts or omissions that had occurred outside of 
the three-year limitations period.94  Therefore, for the motion to be granted, Farrand 
would have to establish that no acts or omissions occurring before September 14, 
2004, contributed to the proximate cause of the injury that Baker alleged continued 
into November 2006.95  The Law Court found that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether the failure to refer Baker to a urologist in 2002 or 2003 was a 
part of the proximate cause of the delayed diagnosis of his prostate cancer, which 
affected his prognosis and treatment options.96  Therefore, the Law Court vacated 
the partial summary judgment order and remanded the case, instructing the 
Superior Court that for Baker to recover for any negligence occurring outside the 
limitations period, he would have to show that each act or omission deviated from 
the applicable standard of care and contributed to the proximate cause of his 
harm.97 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. ¶ 24. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. ¶ 25. 
 92. Id.  Baker could have in fact sued for the acts or omissions that occurred during the statutory 
period; however, because the damages suffered during this period were either indeterminate or 
negligible, monetary relief would presumably have been limited.  Id. ¶ 6. 
 93. Id. ¶ 30. 
 94. Id. ¶ 32. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. ¶ 33. 
 97. Id. ¶ 34.  In its analysis, the Law Court did not consider fraudulent concealment under title 14, 
section 859 of the Maine Revised Statutes, which provides that “[i]f a person, liable to any action 
mentioned, fraudulently conceals the cause thereof from the person entitled thereto, or if a fraud is 
committed which entitles any person to an action, the action may be commenced at any time within 6 
years after the person entitled thereto discovers that he has just cause of action . . . .”  ME. REV. STAT. 
tit. 14, § 859 (2010).  Although Farrand did not commit fraud through any affirmative statements, “fraud 
is not limited to affirmative false statements of material facts,” and may be shown by “a failure to 
disclose or by silence when there is a duty to disclose.”  Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 17, 960 
A.2d 1178 (Alexander, J., dissenting).  In order to prove fraudulent concealment that can toll the statute 
of limitations, a plaintiff must establish: 
either (1) that defendants actively concealed materials facts from [the plaintiff] and that 
[the plaintiff] relied on their acts or statements to [his or her] detriment . . . or (2) that a 
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V.  ANALYSIS 
A.  A Matter of Statutory Construction 
Read literally, a cause of action “accrues” under section 2902 of the MHSA 
“on the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury,”98 which is easily 
applied in instances where one wrongful act or omission causes the injury.99  The 
Law Court previously held that because the Legislature outlined the contours of the 
statute of limitations in section 2902, the Court had been divested of its ability to 
define accrual.100  However, in cases such as Baker, where a combination of 
multiple acts or omissions caused the injury, there is no single discernible date for 
statute of limitations purposes.101  Due to this ambiguity, the Law Court fittingly 
assumed the role of defining accrual.102 
In Baker, the Law Court devoted a significant amount of time to explaining 
why “act or omission” could be read in the plural to include multiple acts or 
omissions.103 The Superior Court interpreted the plain meaning of the MHSA to 
mean Baker’s cause of action accrued upon the occurrence of each negligent act 
and rationalized this as a basis for foreclosing any recovery for acts committed 
before 2004.104  However, when not inconsistent with the plain meaning of the 
statute,105 the Legislature provides that “[w]ords of the singular number may 
include the plural; and words of the plural number may include the singular.”106  
Therefore, the Law Court’s determination that the statute did not limit “act or 
omission” to the singular was consistent with the MHSA’s definition of 
professional negligence and allowed a series of related acts or omissions to create a 
single cause of action.107  Without its lengthy discussion and conclusion that act or 
                                                                                                                 
special relationship existed between the parties that imposed a duty to disclose the cause 
of action, and the failure of defendants to honor that duty. 
Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997 ME 207, ¶ 6, 701 A.2d 370.  A fiduciary relationship fulfills the 
requirement of a special relationship.  Dickey, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 18, 960 A.2d 1179 (Alexander, J., 
dissenting).  Therefore, as the result of their physician-patient relationship, Baker and Farrand had a 
special and confidential relationship that required Farrand to disclose the PSA test levels to Baker.  See 
70 C.J.S. Physicians & Surgeons § 76 (2005) (“The patient has the right to assume that the physician 
will advise him or her properly in all matters pertaining to his or her ailment, including advice as to 
persons properly qualified to assist in his or her treatment.”).  By not revealing the PSA test levels to 
Baker, Farrand potentially committed fraudulent concealment under title 14, section 859 of the Maine 
Revised Statutes that would have tolled the statute of limitations until six years after Baker discovered 
his cause of action.  Hence, had the Law Court addressed this issue, it could have conceivably avoided 
the statute of limitations problem entirely. 
 98. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2902 (2010). 
 99. See Bolton v. Caine, 541 A.2d 924, 925 (Me. 1988). 
 100. See Dasha v. Me. Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 996 (Me. 1995). 
 101. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 13.05[1]. 
 102. See Dickey, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 28, 960 A.2d 1179. 
 103. See Baker v. Farrand, 2011 ME 91, ¶¶ 22-29, 26 A.3d 806. 
 104. Id. ¶ 26. 
 105. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 1, § 71 (2010). 
 106. Id. § 71(9). 
 107. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 28, 26 A.3d 806.  Illinois, another state that has adopted the continuing 
course of negligent treatment doctrine, interpreted its statute of limitations the same way.  See 
Cunningham v. Huffman, 609 N.E.2d 321, 325 (Ill. 1993). 
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omission could be read in the plural, the Law Court would not have been able to 
accept the continuing negligent treatment doctrine without tolling the statute of 
limitations, which the court interpreted as an option the Legislature had foreclosed 
under the circumstances of this case.108 
B.  A Single Cause of Action? 
Going forward, Baker provides that in order for a combination of more than 
one act or omission to create a single cause of action, “each independent act or 
omission, viewed in isolation from the other acts or omissions [must] constitute[] 
an independent deviation from the applicable standard of care” and must contribute 
to the proximate cause of the injury.109  Justice Silver, dissenting in Dickey, took a 
different approach and advocated that in instances of more than one negligent act, 
“proof of proximate cause and damages is not offered independently as to each of 
the acts or omissions in the series, but rather as to the continuum of treatment as a 
whole.”110  Under this interpretation, rather than proving that each act individually 
proximately caused the injury in some way, the plaintiff’s burden is to prove that 
the continuum of negligence as a whole proximately caused the injury.111  The 
majority in Dickey rejected this proposition, holding that for the continuing 
negligent treatment doctrine to apply “every claim . . . [in the negligent treatment] 
requires proof of the four elements,”112 a conclusion echoed in Baker.113  Thus, in 
order for Baker to recover on remand, he must demonstrate that “each of those acts 
or omissions deviated from the applicable standard of care and, in combination 
with an act or omission that occurred within the limitations period, contributed to 
and was a proximate cause of his harm.”114   
Isolating each act or omission from the others runs contrary to the Law Court’s 
treatment of Baker’s claim as a single cause of action as opposed to four separate 
ones.115  The Law Court mandated that “every claim for negligence requires proof 
of duty, breach, proximate causation, and harm.”116  In this case, the Law Court 
concedes that Baker had a single claim that arose from multiple acts of 
negligence.117  If all of Farrand’s individual acts or omissions constituted a single 
cause of action, it logically follows that the proper inquiry should be whether the 
entire course of treatment as a whole was negligent, as opposed to requiring each 
and every act or omission to be negligent.118 
                                                                                                                 
 108. See Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 21 n.5, 26 A.3d 806 (citation to footnote only). 
 109. Id. ¶ 24. 
 110. Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 33, 960 A.2d 1179 (Silver, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
 111. See id. ¶ 34. 
 112. Id. ¶ 9 n.2 (majority opinion) (citation to footnote only). 
 113. See Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 24, 26 A.3d 806. 
 114. Id. ¶ 34. 
 115. The four separate causes of action would be the failure to refer Baker to a urologist in 2002, 
2003, 2004, and in 2005. 
 116. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 20, 26 A.3d 806 (emphasis added). 
 117. Id. ¶ 24. 
 118. See Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 33, 960 A.2d 1179 (Silver, J., dissenting). 
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This is further validated by the fact that it may be difficult in a course of 
treatment to prove which act or omission proximately caused the injury.119  Baker 
compounds this problem by requiring that plaintiffs show each act or omission 
proximately caused the harm complained of “to at least some demonstrable 
degree.”120  Thus, in order to recover for injuries that occurred outside of the 
limitations period, Baker will need to prove that each failure of Farrand to refer 
him to a urologist proximately caused the injury in some demonstrable way,121 
which necessarily involves proving at what point his cancer became sufficiently 
advanced to limit his treatment options, because any failure to refer him to a 
urologist after that time would not have caused any additional harm. 
The differences in the approaches taken by the court in Baker and that of the 
Dickey dissent are illuminated by altering the facts in Baker.  Had one of the test 
results between 2002 and 2006 been within the normal range, Farrand’s failure to 
refer Baker to a urologist at that juncture would not have been considered 
independently negligent, and consequently, the Law Court’s requirements would 
not be met.122  Thus, the continuing negligent treatment doctrine would be 
inapplicable and recovery for any negligence that occurred outside the three-year 
statutory period would be barred.123  Yet, looking at the treatment as a whole, a 
course of treatment that had included one normal test amongst three high level tests 
could still be considered negligent and would not be barred.124 
C.  Other Accrual Methods as Applied to the MHSA 
In cases that involve repeated negligence, the traditional rule that ties accrual 
to the date of the negligence or when the plaintiff has a legal remedy becomes 
difficult to administer because accrual becomes ambiguous.125  While the Law 
Court conceivably could have applied the traditional rule, it determined that “act or 
omission” could be read in the plural, consistent with the statutory definition of 
“professional negligence.”126  By doing so, the Law Court joined the steady trend 
of states that have rejected the traditional rule as applied to situations such as 
these.127 
                                                                                                                 
 119. See id.  This in turn reflects the ambiguity of defining accrual as “the date of the act or omission 
giving rise to the injury.”  ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2902 (2010). 
 120. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 29, 26 A.3d 806. 
 121. See id. ¶ 34. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. ¶ 29. 
 124. See Dickey, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 33, 960 A.2d 1179 (Silver, J., dissenting).  An argument could also 
be made that in a relationship such as that of a physician-patient, where the former is under a continued 
duty to provide non-negligent care, the failure to correct any prior negligence can constitute an act or 
omission because by not correcting prior negligence the physician is in fact contributing to the injury.  
Hence, not correcting prior negligence could in fact be considered a negligent act.  The Law Court did 
not address this point.  Nonetheless, it has been rejected in other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., Kaminer v. 
Canas, 653 S.E.2d 691, 695 (Ga. 2007) (holding that any subsequent failures to diagnose a condition do 
not constitute new injuries for statute of limitations purposes). 
 125. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, §13.05. 
 126. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2502(6) (2010). 
 127. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, §13.05. 
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As for the continuous treatment and continuous course of treatment doctrines, 
in both Dickey and Baker the Law Court determined that the Legislature foreclosed 
its ability to adopt any method that tied accrual to the end of the doctor-patient 
relationship because it would involve tolling the statute of limitations.128  This 
interpretation is consistent with the MHSA when only one act or omission causes 
the injury because accrual can unambiguously be tied to the date of that specific act 
or omission129 and the general rule for statutes of limitations would apply.130  But 
when multiple acts or omissions create a single cause of action, the only thing that 
meaningfully distinguishes the continuous treatment doctrine, the continuous 
course of treatment doctrine, and the continuing negligent treatment doctrine is a 
determination as to whether the treatment as a whole was negligent.  If over a 
course of treatment a doctor commits both negligent and non-negligent actions, the 
inquiry should be whether the doctor’s treatment, viewed as a whole and not as 
separate acts or omissions, constitutes negligent treatment.  Hence, the end of the 
doctor-patient relationship would be relevant to determine the last negligent act, 
which under the Law Court’s analysis is when the cause of action accrues.131   
The Legislature stipulated that the discovery rule would apply to § 2902 when 
“the cause of action is based upon the leaving of a foreign object in the body, in 
which case the cause of action shall accrue when the plaintiff discovers or 
reasonably should have discovered the harm.”132   Hence, in foreign object cases, 
the Legislature allowed the discovery rule to toll the limitations period.133  By 
specifically adopting the discovery rule in these situations, the Legislature 
presumably excluded its adoption in other situations.134   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In Baker v. Farrand, the Law Court adopted the continuing negligent treatment 
doctrine in limited circumstances.135  In doing so, Maine joined the increasing 
number of states that have moved away from the traditional rule that accrual occurs 
on the date of the injury,136 which had not only led to unjust results for patients, but 
also had become unworkable in situations where treatment spans multiple acts or 
omissions because it is nearly impossible for a plaintiff to prove at what point the 
injury accrued.137  While the MHSA’s definition of professional negligence allows 
multiple acts or omissions to constitute a single cause of action, the Law Court 
significantly narrowed the doctrine’s applicability by requiring that each individual 
act or omission be negligent, as opposed to determining whether the treatment as a 
whole was negligent.138   
                                                                                                                 
 128. See Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 19, 26 A.3d 806; Dickey, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 7, 960 A.2d 1179. 
 129. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2902 (2010). 
 130. Bolton v. Caine, 541 A.2d 924, 925 (Me. 1988). 
 131. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 25, 26 A.3d 806. 
 132. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2902 (emphasis added). 
 133. See id. 
 134. See Dasha v. Me. Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 996 (Me. 1995). 
 135. Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 24, 26 A.3d 806. 
 136. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 17, § 13.05[1]. 
 137. See Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 33, 960 A.2d 1179 (Silver, J., dissenting). 
 138. See Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 29, 26 A.3d 806. 
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A better approach would have been that proposed by the dissent in Dickey, 
whereby negligent treatment is determined by looking at the treatment in its 
entirety, as opposed to each act or omission individually.139  The Law Court should 
have adopted a broader meaning of continuing negligent treatment that views the 
physician-patient relationship as a whole, and not through the lens of individual 
acts or omissions.  In Baker, the continuing negligent treatment doctrine allowed 
the plaintiff’s claim to proceed; however, future applications may result in 
hardships for patients who have been subjected to treatment that includes one or 
more non-negligent acts, but is negligent overall.   
 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Dickey, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 33, 960 A.2d 1179 (Silver, J., dissenting). 
